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THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND RACIAL POLITICS
Nelson Lundt
INTRODUCTION

The institution of slavery indubitably generated the most
serious and intractable political problems that the United States
has faced. It is much less obvious which American institution has
provided the most effective leadership in coping with slavery's
legacy. At least among lawyers, there would be considerable
sentiment for awarding this honor to the federal courts. Certainly
those courts have frequently and vigorously acted as though they
were vying for the prize.
A special role for the federal judiciary would hardly be out of
place. Slavery was always inconsistent with the most
fundamental principles of the American regime, but it persisted
because of interest-group politics. After the Constitution was
amended to grant full citizenship and equal legal rights to the
liberated slaves and their descendants, a similar form of interestgroup politics was bound to resist the full realization of this
formal grant. As the governmental institution most insulated
from such political pressure, the federal judiciary might naturally
have become the most scrupulous guardian of the rights provided
by the Constitution and especially by the Reconstruction
Amendments.
For all the glorification, and self-glorification, that has
accompanied judicial activity in dealing with issues of racial
discrimination,' I believe that the United States Supreme

t Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law;, Ph.D., Harvard
University, 1981; J.D., University of Chicago, 1985. For helpful comments on an early
draft of this Article, the author is grateful to Jay S. Bybee, Roger Clegg, Neal
Devins, Stephen G. Gilles, Mara S. Lund, John 0. McGinnis, and Glen D. Nager. The
Law and Economics Center at the George Mason University School of Law provided
generous financial support. Special thanks to Professor Stephen Wermiel of the
Georgia State University College of Law and all those who helped make this
symposium possible.
1. For a thoughtful discussion of this phenomenon, written by a respected federal
judge, see Patrick E. Higginbotham, Conceptual Rigor: A Cabin for the Rhetoric of
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Court's performance has been fairly dismal. It could have
pursued its proper function by faithfully protecting the rights
that the Constitution secured for all Americans, a task that at
some times would have required little more than simple courage
and at other times would have required wrestling with genuinely
difficult interpretive problems. Time after time, however, the
Justices have either found the job of applying the Constitution
too inglorious or treated the task of investigating the meaning of
the Constitution as too burdensome. Setting itself up instead as a
kind of great shepherd of the people, the Court has repeatedly
undertaken to impose its members' personal political judgments
about how the country should handle the difficult social problems
that have arisen from slavery and its aftermath. This
adventurism might be defensible, at least in retrospect, if the
Justices' political judgments had generally proved superior to the
judgments embodied in the Constitution and laws. But I do not
believe that the evidence will support such a defense.
At least in comparison with the Court, Congress has compiled
a record that is not so very terrible. Congress can easily be
criticized-though perhaps a little too easily in some cases, given
how cheap the wisdom of hindsight is-for having been too slow,
too prone to compromise, and too irresolute. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to identify any major federal statutes that significantly
retarded progress toward the equality of rights that the
Constitution promises. And Congress must also get credit for a
number of very significant statutes, beginning with those enacted
during Reconstruction, that implemented the Constitution's
goals, and in some cases, went well beyond what our constitutive
document can fairly be read to require. The Supreme Court,
however, has perversely interpreted some of these statutes so as
actually to undermine the legal equality that Congress sought to
establish.
Many of the Court's errors are now mainly of academic
interest, either because they are without continuing direct effects
or because they are, as a practical matter, beyond correction. But
some of the mistakes plague us still. Where they can be
corrected, the Court should do so, and it should do so in an
appropriately judicial manner. This last suggestion, of course,

Heroism, 59 TEX- L. REV. 1329 (1981) (reviewing JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES
(1981)).
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rests on the controversial assumption that there is a meaningful
distinction between the judicial function of interpreting and
applying the laws and the legislature's political function of
choosing what policies the law should adopt. Even if it is true
that the judicial function cannot be entirely purged of political
judgment in every circumstance, I believe that the Supreme
Court's racial discrimination jurisprudence has been politicized
far more often and far more thoroughly than necessity would
dictate. If anything, the Court frequently has seemed intent on
purging its own function of anything except political judgment. It
is not too late to begin resisting that inclination.
In this short Article, I will not try to defend the many broad
generalizations that I have just made. Instead, I will discuss the
Supreme Court's three most famous constitutional decisions on
racial discrimination. Before taking up the case that is the
subject of this symposium, Plessy v. Ferguson,' I will briefly
discuss its most famous predecessor, Dred Scott v. Sandford,'
4 In
and its most famous successor, Brown v. Board of Education.
these famous and typical cases, the Justices impatiently and
arrogantly presumed to exercise their own political judgment in
the guise of constitutional "interpretation." This kind of
politicized judging was not necessary. Nor was it somehow
redeemed by subsequent events, for the actual effects of the
decisions ranged from horrible to insignificant.
Much has changed since Plessy, and even since Brown v. Board
of Education. Our society has changed, our statutory law has
changed, and political leanings on the Supreme Court have
changed. But one thing has been fairly constant: the Justices'
aversion to consulting the Constitution in cases involving racial
discrimination. This Article concludes with a recent example that
illustrates how persistent the temptation to engage in political
judging has remained.

2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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THREE TRAVESTIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

A.

Dred Scott v. Sandford

As an act of judicial politics, Chief Justice Taney's opinion in
Dred Scott' probably has no living defenders. The opinion's
callous attitude toward the horror of slavery must provoke a
visceral disgust in any civilized modern reader. If one tried to
imagine how this attitude could have been justified, one would
have to suppose that it might have somehow contributed to the
preservation of the Union. But of course it did not. Whatever role
Taney's opinion played in provoking the War Between the States,
it certainly did nothing to forestall that conflagration.
If Taney's rhetoric now seems utterly indefensible, however, it
is still fair to ask whether the decision itself was not required by
the law. Some modern commentators, indeed, have argued that
because Taney correctly interpreted the original intent of the
Constitution, Dred Scott proves that judges must be authorized
and in fact obliged to ignore the written Constitution when it
conflicts with a higher or deeper ideal.6 Judges, in other words,
should substitute their own political and moral judgments for
those embodied in the Constitution, at least on very important
questions. And if we are to criticize those judgments, it should be
on moral or political grounds rather than on grounds of
usurpation.'

5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6. This view has been most relentlessly expounded by political scientist Harry V.
Jaffa. Perhaps the most concise statement of his position came when he denounced
Robert Bork's insistence on the primacy of constitutional text and structure in
constitutional interpretation: "[I]t was precisely attention to 'constitutional text and
structure' divorced from the 'abstractions of moral philosophy' that led Taney to his
conclusions in Dred Scott." HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF
THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 31 (1994). For a perceptive critique of

Professor Jaffa's position, see Charles J. Cooper, Harry Jaffa's Bad Originalism, 1994
PUB. INT. L. REV. 189.
7. See, e.g., JAFFA, supra note 6, at 67-68 (rejecting the view that the issue in
Dred Scott was whether Congress had the authority to prohibit slavery in the
territories, and claiming instead that "whether slavery was right or wrong was the
only important question in Dred Scott'); id. at 70 ("The judgment in Dred Scott
declaring the Missouri law of 1820 unconstitutional was, however, perfectly reasonable
once one conceded that the question of the Negro's personality was purely a matter
of positive law."); id. at 104 ("Taney's opinion in Dred Scott was wrong for one
paramount reason. He did not see that the Constitution, grounded in the principles of
the Declaration of Independence, reflected a standard of justice other than positive
law."); id. at 299 ("In short, it was not Taney who read the right to slave ownership
into the Constitution; it is Judge Bork who has read it out of the Constitution.").
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Whatever might be said in favor of liberating judges from the
obligation to apply the law when it conflicts with their own moral
or political intuitions, Dred Scott is evidence for exactly the
opposite conclusion. The decision in that case was based on a
demonstrably false "interpretation" of the Constitution. Chief
Justice Taney, moreover, was fully aware of this fact, for the
demonstration was provided with devastating clarity and
excruciating detail in Justice Curtis's dissent.
Recall the case. Scott's master took him from Missouri through
Illinois to the Upper Louisiana Territory (where slavery had been
outlawed by the Missouri Compromise) and then back to
Missouri.' Scott was then sold to a citizen of New York who tried
to take possession of his purchase in Missouri.9 Scott sued for
his freedom in federal court, invoking diversity jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court concluded that Scott was not entitled to sue
because Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority when
it outlawed slavery in the Upper Louisiana Territory, and
because a black person in any event could not be a citizen of the
United States under the Constitution."
Taney's opinion for the Court deployed a remarkably modern
doctrine to invalidate the Missouri Compromise: substantive due
process.' In defending Congress's authority to outlaw slavery in
the territories, Scott had invoked the Constitution's express grant
to Congress of power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." 3 Taney interpreted this
provision, however, to apply only to the territory owned by the
United States when the Constitution was adopted. With respect
to territory acquired later, he claimed, Congress's power to
govern was merely implicit. Such implicit authority, said Taney,
was trumped by the right of property in slaves, a right "distinctly
and expressly affirmed in the Constitution" 4 and protected by

8. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 431 (1857).

9. IdL
10. Id. at 400.
11. Id. at 452-53.
12. The link between Taney's innovation in Dred Scott and later cases like Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), has been
frequently noted. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31-32 (1990).
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
14. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451.
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the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause against abridgements
like that found in the Missouri Compromise.
Taney's far-fetched construction of the Property Clause need
not detain us here, for his argument has two other fatal defects.
First, a right of property in slaves was not "distinctly and
expressly affirmed" in the Constitution, which contained only the
most oblique references to the peculiar institution. Indeed, the
constitutional provision that came closest to implying a kind of
property right in slaves also implied, if anything, that Congress
actually had the power to outlaw slavery in the territories. The
so-called Fugitive Slave Clause provided that when those bound
to service under the laws of one state escaped into another state,
they were not to be discharged from service but rather delivered
back upon the claim of the party to whom the service was due."5
On its face, therefore, this provision applied only to those slaves
escaping to a state, not to a territory, thus implying that
congressional authority over the territories was left
undiminished.
Second, Taney's conversion of the Due Process Clause into a
substantive guarantee, like so many similar conversions that
have followed, was based on mere assertion: a statute that
deprived a citizen of his property merely because he brought that
property into a territory "could hardly be dignified with the name
of due process of law."" This assumes, at a minimum, that
there was a right to own slaves whose source was outside the
positive laws of the slave states. But that insupportable
assumption was not even shared by the slave states themselves,
all of which acknowledged the ancient requirements of due

15. The Clause provided in full that "No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. Well before Dred Scott, the Supreme Court had
perversely concluded that state legislation implementing this rule, which had been
designed to ensure that free blacks were not dragooned into slavery, was
unconstitutional. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). One reason
given for this bizarre conclusion was that any state regulation delaying a slave owner
from exercising dominion over his property amounted to a temporary discharge from
slavery, and thus violated a right protected by the federal Constitution. Id. at 612-13.
Such nonsense did not bear legally on the issue in Dred Scott, but it did serve as a
precedent for a judicial policy of expanding the limited safeguards that the
Constitution itself extended to the institution of slavery.
16. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450.
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process and some of which had enacted laws treating slaves
newly brought within their borders exactly as the Missouri
Compromise purported to treat Dred Scott.17
As unforgivable as it was to invalidate the Missouri
Compromise on the basis of arguments like these, Taney
managed to exceed even this effrontery by offering an alternative
ground for dismissing Scott's case. Even if Scott had been set free
by federal law when he was taken into the Upper Louisiana
Territory, he could not sue in federal court. And why not?
Because the mere fact of his ancestry disqualified him from
becoming a citizen of the United States. And why was that?
Taney's wordy explanation boiled down to this: Congress was
given the power to establish uniform rules of naturalization in
order to prevent one state from introducing into the political
community created by the Constitution the sort of people
originally excluded from it, for such people could then migrate to
other states and enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed privileges
and immunities of citizenship. 8 And this certainly meant
blacks, according to Taney, because they had not been citizens of
any state or considered eligible for the rights and privileges of
citizenship at the time the Constitution was adopted. 9
Whatever its other weaknesses, Taney's argument founders on
a question of fact. He conceded that every class of persons
recognized as citizens by the states when the Constitution was
adopted automatically became citizens of the new political
body.2" His argument that Dred Scott could not be a citizen of
the United States thus depended on his claim that free blacks
had not been citizens of the states when the Constitution was
adopted. But Justice Curtis demonstrated that this was factually
incorrect.2 ' And Taney offered no refutation of Curtis's
demonstration. Thus, not only was Taney's argument crucially
dependent on an untrue proposition, but Taney had to know the
proposition was untrue. His is thus the jurisprudence of the baldfaced lie.
Perhaps the most famous passage in Taney's opinion is this:

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 626-27 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
at 405-06.
at 407.
at 406.
at 572-75 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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They [of African descent] had for more than a century
before [the Founding] been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold,
and treated as an 6rdinary article of merchandise and traffic,
whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at
that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the
white race.'
This exaggeration of the facts, or the Court's strong desire to
read the implications of this exaggeration into the Constitution,
was the real basis for Taney's supposedly legal reasoning. We
would all be better off if the fame that has attached to this
passage were bestowed instead on Justice Curtis's far more
accurate analysis:
Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford
rules of juridical interpretation. They are different in
different men. They are different in the same men at
different times. And when a strict interpretation of the
Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern the
interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical
opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we
have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government
of individual men, who for the time being have power to
declare what the Constitution is, according to their own
views of what it ought to mean.'
The specific constitutional amendments adopted in Dred Scott
lasted only "for the time being," just as Justice Curtis suggested
they would. The judicial itch to substitute political judgment for
interpretive judgment, however, has not proved so transitory.
B.

Brown v. Board of Education

The Supreme Court's most revered case on racial
discrimination may well have been rightly decided as a legal
matter. You would never know it, however, from reading Chief
Justice Warren's opinion. Without any analysis of the

22. Id. at 407.
23. Id. at 620-21 (emphasis added).
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Constitution's text, the Court dismissed the legislative history of
the Fourteenth Amendment as "inconclusive" and declared
separate educational facilities for blacks and whites "inherently
unequal."24 This conclusion was based entirely on a
psychological judgment: at least in the context of public schools,
"[t]o separate [children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'
As Andrew Kull has arrestingly and insightfully suggested,
this looks like a straightforward application of the legal rule
adopted in the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson.26
Racial classifications, announced Justice Brown [in Plessy],
are like every other sort of classification, and those racial
classifications will be constitutional that a majority of the
Supreme Court considers to be "reasonable." That rule of
constitutional law, and no other, will explain every Supreme
Court decision in the area of racial discrimination from 1896
to the presentY
Professor Kull's conclusion gets particularly strong support from
the fact that the Court followed Brown with a series of per
curiam decisions declaring many forms of segregation
unconstitutional, while refusing to strike down laws dealing with
the sensitive subject of miscegenation, and all without any
explanation whatsoever." Because the rationale on which Brown
was ostensibly based applied only to primary and secondary
education, the real basis unifying that decision with its
immediate progeny therefore must have been something that the
Justices were unable or unwilling to articulate. Political
intuitions about what is "reasonable" at the moment fit this
description better than any other plausible explanation for the
Justices' behavior.
That does not necessarily mean that Brown was wrongly
decided, or that it could not have been given a sound legal

24. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489, 495 (1954).
25. Id. at 494.
26. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
27. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONsTITUTION 118 (1992). "[In its broad
holding as opposed to its particular application, Plessy has never been overruled, even
by implication." Id. at 113.
28. See id. at 159-61.
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justification. If the decision in Brown was correct, however, it
must be for reasons like those recently advanced by Michael W.
McConnell, who has demonstrated that a substantial majority of
the political leaders who supported the Fourteenth Amendment
believed that segregated schools were unconstitutional. 29 That
belief is consistent with the constitutional text, though by no
means compelled by it. Public education can plausibly be
regarded as a civil right protected by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause (especially now that all jurisdictions provide
free public education for their citizens), and state-enforced
segregation can plausibly be regarded as an abridgement of that
right. Had the Court offered an argument along the lines of
Professor McConnell's, Brown would have been a perfectly
ordinary and respectable act of constitutional interpretation. The
Court might have had to wait until someone offered the
argument McConnell makes, but it is hard to believe-in light of
the extraordinary industry and resourcefulness that the modem
civil rights bar has displayed-that it would have had to wait
forty years.
The Supreme Court, however, was not willing to wait for a
good argument, and perhaps it was not even capable of telling
the civil rights bar what kind of argument was needed. It is now
conventional wisdom that the Court's impatience was justified by
the pressing need to get the schools desegregated. That defense
of the Court's behavior, however, collapses under the fact that
Brown did almost nothing to desegregate the schools." Ten
years of "all deliberate speed" produced virtually no results, and
it was only after Congress stepped in with the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that desegregation actually occurred.3 ' So much for the

29. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947 (1995).
30. See, e.g.,

GERALD N.

ROSENBERG, THE

HOLLOW

HOPE: CAN

COURTs

BRING

ABouT SOcIAL CHANGE? (1991).
31. Perhaps the most ingenious effort to attribute responsibility for desegregation to
Brown is made by Michael J. Kiarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994). Professor KIarman argues that Brown contributed
to the inflammation of Southern segregationist sentiment, which enabled civil rights
leaders to provoke violent responses to peaceful demonstrations, which in turn
aroused Northern sentiment in favor of a federal legislative response. Even assuming
that Klarman has correctly assigned Brown a significant role in the chain of events
that led eventually to the statutes that were enacted by Congress in the mid-1960s,
the Justices could hardly have planned all this. If they had, doing them justice would
require a new Machiavelli.
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urgency that is supposed to have justified ignoring the
Constitution.
Though Brown did not desegregate the schools, it managed to
fix the Justices' moral and political intuitions in a lofty status
somewhere above the Constitution itself. On the same day that
Brown was decided, for example, the Court declared
unconstitutional a federal law providing for segregated schools in
the District of Columbia: "In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially
segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government."3 2 The word "unthinkable" in this sentence can
have no other meaning than "intolerable." By assuming that the
Constitution could only mean what the Justices could tolerate,
the Court thus united itself in spirit with the Dred Scott majority
and, as we shall see, with the Plessy Court as well.
The elevation of the Justices' intuitions has carried the Court
into some political acts that have not been quite as well received
as the desegregation of the District of Columbia schools. The
abortion decisions are the most conspicuous of these acts, and the
Court has now taken to wrapping itself in the mantle of Brown
as a shield against criticisms of those decisions. For example, in
Planned Parenthood of South Eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,33
the Court explained:
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court
decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of
intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe [v. Wade] and
those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension
that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the
dimension present whenever the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a
common mandate rooted in the Constitution.
The Court is not asked to do this very often, having thus
addressed the Nation only twice in our lifetime, in the
decisions of Brown [v. Board of Education] and Roe ....

32. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (emphasis added).
33. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
(1992).
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...Like the character of an individual, the legitimacy of
the Court must be earned over time. So, indeed, must be the
character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to
the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people is
not readily separable from their understanding of the Court
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional
cases and speak before all others for their constitutional
ideals. If the Court's legitimacy should be undermined, then,
so would the country be in its very ability to see itself
through its constitutional ideals. The Court's concern with
legitimacy is not for the sake of the Court, but for the sake of
the Nation to which it is responsible.3 4
For understandable reasons, the Casey Court neglected to discuss
Dred Scott. Just as understandably, Justice Scalia's impassioned
dissent gave Dred Scott a prominent place.35 Whatever one
thinks about abortion and how the law should regard it, no one
who has read both the Constitution and the Court's abortion
decisions can honestly believe that the former implies the latter.
As the quoted passage indicates, however, a majority of the
Justices consider that little detail irrelevant.
What we are urged to concern ourselves with now is the
importance of protecting the Supreme Court's legitimacy as the
great resolver of national controversies. As the Court recognized
in the last sentence quoted above, however, it is easy to see why
the Justices would be concerned with preserving this role for
themselves, and much less easy to see why the rest of us should
have the same interest they do. But maybe that is the point of
the citation to Brown. The chilling, though unstated, message of
this passage seems to be: "If we were to reconsider Roe v. Wade,
we might also be obliged to reconsider Brown v. Board of
Education. And you wouldn't like that very much, now would
you?" Thus, the Court's claim on the rhetoric and honors of the
political leader may be leading it increasingly to adopt some
rather less elevated arts of the politician as well.36

34. Id. at 866-68.
35. Id. at 984-85, 998, 1001-1002.
36. It is probably no coincidence that the holding in Casey closely mirrored public
sentiment as expressed in the latest opinion polls. See William Schneider, A Legal
Victory or Political Setback?, 24 NATL J. 1666 (July 11, 1992).
In the latest poll by CNN-USA Today-Gallup Organization Inc.,
taken just after the Court announced its decision in the Pennsylvania
case, a third of Americans said they felt that abortion should be 'legal
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As Professor McConnell has now shown, the holding in Brown
seems to stand up pretty well in light of the Constitution.3 7 But
it is hard to imagine that McConnell's work could be of any real
interest to the Supreme Court. The Court's indifference to the
Constitution, and the Justices' concomitant obsession with
writing their own political beliefs into constitutional law, is
nothing new and it is nowhere better exemplified than in the
case to which this symposium is dedicated, Plessy v. Ferguson.
C.

Plessy v. Ferguson

After its disastrous decision in Dred Scott, and the
extraordinarily careful and elaborate attention that Congress
gave to adjustments in the Constitution and laws after the
ensuing civil war, the Supreme Court might have been expected
to begin emulating Justice Curtis by taking up the pursuit of
legal rather than political analysis. But this did not occur.
Plessy v. Ferguson" has come down to us as the most
notorious example of the Court's refusal to enforce the promise of
the Reconstruction Amendments, in large part because of Justice
Harlan's dissent. The majority's approach to the case was
certainly misguided, and its decision may well have been wrong.
But Harlan's dissent does not deserve the adoration that it now
receives. His political or moral judgment certainly looks superior
to that of his colleagues, but his legal analysis was little better.
In that respect, the opinion he wrote is fundamentally different
from Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott.
Plessy raised a real issue. The challenged statute required
railroads operating in Louisiana to furnish "equal but separate
accommodations" for white and black passengers and provided for
legal penalties against railroad officials or passengers who
breached the required separation.3 9 Because Louisiana's statute
made it equally illegal for a black passenger to travel in a "white"
compartment or for a white to travel in a "black" compartment, it

under any circumstances." Only an eighth of the respondents thought
abortion should be "illegal in all circumstances." Almost half said abortion
should be "legal only under certain circumstances." Strong majorities of
71-81 per cent endorsed each of the restrictions the Court upheld
(counseling, a 24-hour waiting period and parental consent for minors).
Id.
37. See McConnell, supra note 29.
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. Id. at 540-42.
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treated the members of both races the same in a formal sense. It
is not immediately obvious whether this formal equality should
have saved the statute from invalidation under the federal
Constitution.40
If the Louisiana statute was unconstitutional, it must have
been because it abridged Plessy's privileges or immunities as a
citizen of the United States or because it denied him the equal
protection of the laws. In order to determine whether the right to
associate with those of a different race while traveling on a train
was covered by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, one would
have to find out what rights were referred to by those who
framed and ratified this constitutional provision. Similarly, one
would have to discover just what the Equal Protection Clause
was meant to require the states to protect people from. If taken
seriously, these are difficult questions. 4' The Plessy Court,
however, did not even take the questions seriously enough to ask
them.
The Court's analysis began with the following proposition:
The object of the [fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly
to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the
law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to
enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to
either.42
This statement might be treated as little more than a recognition
of the fact that the equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment must have some limits. It certainly could not make
everyone's skin color the same. Nor could it have produced social
equality in the sense of equalizing acquisitions and
accomplishments. And it is impossible to imagine that anyone

40. Cf. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), in which the Court upheld a statute
that applied different penalties for intra- and inter-racial adultery on the ground that

the offense of miscegenation "cannot be committed without involving the persons of
both races in the same punishment." The Court concluded that "[w]hatever
discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two sections [of the law]
is directed against the offence designated and not against the person of any
particular color or race." Id. at 585. Pace, of course, has now been overruled. See
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101
YALE L.J. 1385 (1992).
42. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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intended the Constitution to require people unwillingly to extend
dinner
invitations or marriage proposals to members of another
43
race.

From the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
demand every imaginable sort of racial equality, Justice Brown
leaped to the far different conclusion that the Fourteenth
Amendment permits any regulation that is "reasonable."' Logic
does not authorize the leap, and Brown produced no evidence
from the text or legislative history of the Constitution that could
support his conclusion. What he offered were citations to state
cases upholding laws forbidding miscegenation and upholding
segregated schools and public conveyances. 45 To the extent that
these cases arose under state laws, they are obviously quite
irrelevant to the construction of a federal measure limiting state
power. And to the extent that some of the decisions may have
entailed a construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, they could
not be owed any deference except what they earned through the
persuasiveness of their reasoning.46 But Brown pointed to no
reasoning at all.'
Brown also cited a federal law providing segregated schools for
the District of Columbia.' Because the Fourteenth Amendment
does not restrict Congress, however, this statute does not imply
anything at all about the meaning of that provision of the

43. Id. Giving Justice Brown the benefit of the doubt, I am assuming that he did
not mean to exempt from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment any commingling
of the races to which a majority of either race objected. That would mean, for
example, that a majority of whites could insist on segregated juries, contrary to
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), which Brown recognized as binding
precedent. See id. at 545.
44. Id. at 550 ("[Elvery exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the promotion for the
public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.").
45. Id. at 544-45, 548.
46. Brown also cited Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S.
587 (1890), which he deemed "almost directly in point." Id. at 547. While that case
involved a statute closely resembling the one at issue in Plessy, the Court had
determined only that the statute did not violate the Commerce Clause. The
Fourteenth Amendment had not been construed or even mentioned. So the case was
only "in point" in a way that completely missed the point.
47. Id. Apart from bare citations to cases, Brown offered only a quotation making
the familiar point that the idea of equality before the law cannot mean that the law
must treat everyone exactly the same in all ways. See id. at 544 (quoting from Chief
Justice Shaw's well-known opinion in Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198

(1850)).
48. Id. at 545.

Published by Reading Room, 1996

15
HeinOnline -- 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1143 1995-1996

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 15

1144

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1129

Constitution. Much more revealing is that Congress had
attempted with the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to exercise its
enforcement authority under the Fourteenth Amendment by
outlawing segregated public accommodations like railway cars.
Rather than discuss this much more relevant fact, Justice Brown
instead discussed the irrelevant Supreme Court case invalidating
the 1875 statute because it purported to reach private conduct as
well as state action.49
Although Brown never explained why the Fourteenth
Amendment should be interpreted to permit every "reasonable"
regulation, he gave a very clear explanation of why he thought
segregated public accommodations should be considered
reasonable:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it ....

If the two races

are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the
result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each
other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals....
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political

rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the
other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put
them upon the same plane. 0
This passage begins with a lie and ends with something even
worse. Saying that the degrading implications of "enforced
separation" were simply the result of misinterpretation by blacks
was obviously untrue. The lie was needed, however, to help blur
the distinction between "social equality" and "legal equality." If
Plessy had been suing to force unwilling whites to sit next to him
on a train, Justice Brown's comments about racial instincts and

49. See id. at 546-47 (discussing the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)). Neither

the presence of state action vel non nor the reach of Congress's authority under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was at issue in Plessy. Id.
50. Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
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physical differences might have had some bearing on the case
(though they would not necessarily have been correct or
dispositive). But Plessy was challenging a law that forbade the
voluntary commingling of the races. If that entails a demand for
"social equality," then the distinction between social and legal
equality is nothing but the distinction between good and bad
policy as determined by the state legislatures and their judicial
superintendents. And if the Constitution made a different
judgment, it seems, that judgment was simply quixotic.
Brown's conclusion therefore amounts to the following: the
Constitution cannot require an end to legal restrictions on
people's freedom if a state legislature and a majority of Supreme
Court Justices believe that doing so would "result in accentuating
the difficulties of the present situation." The Plessy Court not
only gave effect to its political judgment about the advisability of
forced segregation, but it treated the Constitution as powerless to
override that judgment. This is lawlessness that goes a step
beyond Dred Scott, for even Taney did not go so far as to suggest
that the Constitution could not overrule the Court's judgment
about what was good for the country.5
Unlike the majority, Justice Harlan had no interest in lying
about what the Louisiana legislature had done." And he saw
the majority's position as a judicial nullification of the
Constitution:
What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between
these races, than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on
the ground that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded
that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied
by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning
of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.

51. Some of Justice Brovn's intellectual descendants have embraced this conclusion.
See, e.g., JoHN RAWLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 238-39 (1993) (arguing that the
Supreme Court could invalidate some constitutional amendments adopted pursuant to
Article V on the ground of inconsistency with "It]he successful practice of [the
Constitution's] ideas and principles over two centuries").
52. In at least three separate places, Harlan clearly implied that the majority was
lying when it denied that the Louisiana statute was meant to degrade blacks. Plessy,
163 U.S. at 557 (rejecting the majority's assertion and stating: "No one would be so
wanting in candor as to assert the contrary"); id. at 560 (describing the "real
meaning" of the statute as something that "all will admit"); id. at 562 (stating that
'[t]he thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will
not mislead anyone").
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... State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil
rights, upon the basis of race, and cunningly devised to
defeat legitimate results of the war, under the pretence of
recognizing equality of rights, can have no other result than
to render permanent peace impossible, and to keep alive a
conflict of races, the continuance of which must do harm to
all concerned.'
As this passage shows, Harlan's diagnosis of the majority's
defiant disregard of the Constitution was rooted in a
disagreement with the majority's political judgment. The majority
thought that segregation would help keep the peace, while
Harlan thought that it would promote continued racial conflict.
Most people today would undoubtedly agree that Harlan was
right and the majority wrong.' But that should not have been
the issue in the case. As a legal opinion, Harlan's discussion of
the case should be judged on its legal analysis.
Sadly, Harlan gave the Constitution almost as little attention
as Justice Brown gave it. Although he praised all three of the
Reconstruction Amendments, Harlan never tied the language of
any of them to the issue in the case and in fact never even
specified which clause of which amendment he thought was
violated by the Louisiana statute. Instead, he just summed them
all up in his notion of a "color-blind" Constitution:
[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.
There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens .... The
humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards
man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of
his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme
law of the land are involved. 55
At some level of generality, all of this is correct or at least
defensible. But it does not tell us which civil rights are

53. Id. at 560-61.
54. Professor Maltz's interesting contribution to this symposium shows how
important it is to avoid extrapolating from Harlan's Plessy dissent to the conclusion
that Harlan's moral or political judgment about racial matters generally would have
provided a sound basis for constitutional law. See Earl M. Maltz, Only Partially
Color-Blind: John Marshall Harlan's View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 973 (1996).
55. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559.
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guaranteed by the Constitution or whether the right to associate

with the members of other races on railroad trains is among
those civil rights. Rather than analyze the Constitution to

answer that question, however, Harlan merely asserted that the
Louisiana statute was "hostile to both the spirit and letter of the
Constitution of the United States.""6 Maybe he got the spirit

right, but he never identified the letter that incorporated that
spirit. And that failure prevented

him from offering

an

intelligibly legal reason for invalidating the Louisiana statute. 7
The sloppiness of Harlan's spirit-based approach is illustrated

by his repeated suggestions that the color-blind "spirit" he
identified included identical prohibitions on both the federal and
state governments." Unless Harlan could argue that Plessy, and
challenges to federal statutes mandating segregation, should be
decided under an extraordinarily expansive interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment, his suggested identification of the
constraints on the state and federal governments was plainly
untenable. Apart from the fact that Harlan did not specifically
invoke the Thirteenth Amendment, relying on it here would have
rendered the Fourteenth Amendment redundant, and made its
elaborate distinctions (among privileges or immunities, due
process, and equal protection) a laughable waste of time and
attention.
This, unfortunately, is the common thread that unites both
opinions in Plessy. Brown and Harlan alike refused to confront
the constitutional text and thus spared themselves the
interpretive difficulties that would have ensued had they done so.
That refusal, repeated in many cases before and after Plessy, has
now become almost a point of principle in our legal culture.
When it comes to racial discrimination, everyone knows

56. Id. at 563.
57. Cf. Letter from Justice Oliver W. Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Apr. 5,
1919), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 7, 8 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941)
(characterizing Harlan's mind as "a powerful vise the jaws of which couldn't be got
nearer than two inches to each other").
58. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554 (stating that the Constitution does not permit "any
public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment
of [civil] rights"); id. at 556 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), for
the proposition that the Constitution forbids " 'discrimination by the General
Government or the States against any citizen because of his race' "); id. at 563
(claiming that the "recent amendments" to the Constitution "obliterated the race line
from our systems of governments, National and State, and placed our free institutions
upon the broad and sure foundation of the equality of all men before the law").
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intuitively what the Constitution must mean. And it always
seems to mean exactly the same thing: whatever the "interpreter"
thinks is good policy.
CONCLUSION: THE SPIRIT OF JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN

Justice Harlan's color-blind constitutional rhetoric has had an
enduring appeal to those dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's
ad hoc racial policy judgments. Perhaps the most striking recent
example of this appeal came in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Peha.59 Concurring in the Court's decision to apply strict
scrutiny to federal affirmative action schemes, Justice Scalia
offered a manifestly conscious evocation of the Harlan
formulation quoted above: "In the eyes of government, we are
just one race here. It is American."" To the extent that Harlan
and Scalia actually state a principle,61 rather than a mere
political judgment, judges will look more judicial when applying
that principle than they have when behaving in the fashion of
Justice Brown. But that does not resolve the nagging question
whether Harlan's color-blind Constitution is the real
Constitution. If it is not, then the Harlans and Scalias may not
be quite so different from the Taneys and Browns as they first
appear. While they may have relinquished some discretion to
make judgments about the suitability of particular racial policies
to particular circumstances, they seem to have retained the
discretion to decide what general racial principles the
Constitution shall include.
But perhaps this is unfair to Harlan and Scalia both. However
loosely Harlan conflated the rules applicable to the state and
federal governments, Plessy did not actually involve a federal
statute. And perhaps one might say that the Equal Protection
Clause provides such an obviously plausible source of the colorblind principle as against the states that it should not much
matter whether Harlan actually identified the source.
Conversely, although Scalia actually invoked his color-blind rule
in a case involving a federal statute, equal protection analysis

59. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
60. Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61. Although Scalia embraces the strict scrutiny approach, which could mean many
things, his scrutiny would apparently be truly strict, so that the exceptions to his
rule of color-blindness would be extremely narrow. See City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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had repeatedly been applied to federal laws long before Scalia
joined the Court. And respect for the Constitution, as everyone
agrees, must sometimes be tempered by respect for the principle
of stare decisis.
These defenses seem unsatisfactory to me, and I find it hard to
see why they should be satisfactory to Justice Scalia. First, if the
Equal Protection Clause were meant to supply a general colorblind principle of the kind articulated by Harlan and Scalia, then
the Fifteenth Amendment would be surplusage and the second
section of the Fourteenth Amendment would apparently be
nonsensical. This fact may not by itself be fatal to the Scalia

position, but it highlights how utterly unobvious it is that the
Fourteenth Amendment's carefully articulated distinctions among
different kinds of rights should be taken as a confused and prolix
substitute for a simple statement that the state governments
are required to behave in a color-blind manner in all
circumstances.6 2
Second, Scalia does not say that he is relying on the authority
of the unreasoned precedents that grafted modern equal
protection analysis onto the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.63 Instead, he cites the Fifteenth Amendment, the
Corruption of Blood Clause, and the federal Title of Nobility
Clause.' But these specialized provisions simply confirm the
obvious absence from the Constitution's text of any general rule
of color-blindness for the federal government.6 5
62. I do not claim that it is obvious exactly what rights the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect, or how this constitutional provision
should be applied to all the myriad questions that have arisen in a changing society.
In fact, it is partly because some of these questions appear so difficult that Scalia's
general rule of governmental color-blindness seems to me to require a careful and
detailed justification before it can be accepted as a matter of constitutional
construction.
63. Someone might contend, though Scalia did not, that the line of modern
precedents applying equal protection analysis under the aegis of the Fifth Amendment
has become such an important part of our legal fabric that it would be irresponsibly
disruptive to return to the original meaning of the Constitution. Even if one assumes
that this highly debatable conclusion could be sustained by persuasive arguments, it
would not follow that the color-blind principle that Scalia advocates is a settled part
of the law. On the contrary, it is clear that it is not. Adarand itself overruled Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. And
Scalia's color-blind principle would pretty clearly require overruling Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
64. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118-19.
65. In Croson, a case that did not involve action by the federal government, Scalia
had recognized that the "substance of the Civil War Amendments" creates a "sound
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Harlan and Scalia offer some attractive political reasons for a
constitutional principle requiring American governments to
behave in a color-blind manner. Any other principle, indeed, may
serve primarily to accentuate the difficulties of the present
situation.66 It may therefore be appropriate to amend the
Constitution, through the procedures set out in Article V, so as to
authorize the courts to apply that principle. Until that is done,
however, the legal principle adopted by Justice Scalia may have
little more strength than the number of votes he can get for it on
the Court. And that power, as Justice Curtis pointed out long
ago, is good only "for the time being."
Judges who long for a color-blind law67 may find that desire
partially satisfied by the Constitution, but not completely. If they
want a supplement, they should look not to phantom
constitutional provisions of their own invention, but to statutes
like the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which actually contains
numerous color-blind provisions whose meaning is quite clear
indeed. But doing that, of course, would require the Court to
correct its own mistakes" rather than the mistakes of those
who framed the Constitution.

distinction" between the state and federal governments when it comes to action based
on race. 488 U.S. 469, 522 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In
Adarand, when the distinction may actually have mattered, Scalia ignored it.
66. Scalia asserts, for example: "To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even
for the most admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for
future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and
race hatred." Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119. There is a substantial literature
elaborating this view. Among many examples, see TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996); THOMAS SOWELL,
PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); Morris B. Abram,
Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1312 (1986);
NELSON LUND, REFORMING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: HOW TO RESTORE THE LAW OF
EQUAL TREATMENT, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORT TO CONGRESS (Aug. 2, 1995).
67. Justice Scalia has made his policy preferences with respect to affirmative action
quite clear in many of his writings on and off the bench. A statement of those
preferences in the context of constitutional adjudication can be found in his
concurring opinion in Croson. See 488 U.S. at 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
68. See, e.g., Johnson v. Santa Clara Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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